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PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE:
THE STANDING PROBLEM
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN*
From its original function of providing a remedy for the inva-
sion of land rights, the law of nuisance has expanded to encompass
a multitude of interferences with the health, safety, and welfare of
the public and individuals. Where a nuisance is injurious to the
public, the government has a right to sue for its abatement. An
individual, however, has traditionally lacked standing to sue for
damages or to enjoin a public nuisance where his injury is not
distinct in degree and/or in kind from the injury to the public as a
whole.
While judicial inroads into this restrictive standing require-
ment have always been possible, courts have consistently been
reluctant to relax the standing requisites for individuals attempt-
ing to sue on the theory of public nuisance. Only recently have
some courts given indications that orthodox common law standing
restrictions may slowly be giving way to the public's interest in a
healthful environment. This article discusses these new cases and
the statutory provisions of several states that have modified the
common law rules.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUISANCE REMEDY
At common law, the action for nuisance was exclusively con-
cerned with the redress of an interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of land. The assize of nuisance was used as early as the
twelfth century when a landowner suffered an injury which did not
amount to a disseisin. In other words, a nuisance action could be
brought where there was only indirect damage to an individual's
land or its enjoyment. By the fifteenth century, the assize of nui-
sance was replaced by an action on the case for nuisance. Unlike
the earlier remedy, under which abatement was possible, the ac-
tion on the case gave rise only to damages. A plaintiff was forced
to resort to equity if he wished to secure abatement by judicial
process.'
*A.B., University of Pittsburgh, 1970; J.D., Georgetown University, 1973;
member District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Bar.
'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 201-203; Prosser, Private Action for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997-99 (1966).
1
Rothstein: Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
This early common law notion of a nuisance being inextricably
related to an interference with an owner's interest in land is now
embodied in the law of private nuisance.' Inasmuch as the interfer-
ence is generally caused by "intangible substances,"' recent pri-
vate nuisance cases are still concerned with the same problems as
the older nuisance cases, such as smoke and soot,4 noise,' and dirt
and vibration.' Private nuisances are evaluated per accidens;
courts apply a reasonableness standard in determining if there is
an unlawful invasion of land rights.7
During the development of the common law of nuisance, sev-
eral illegal acts were legislatively classified as per se nuisances.
These acts against the public health and welfare, such as main-
taining a house of gambling or prostitution, were known as com-
mon or public nuisances.8 A public nuisance, unlike a private nui-
sance, was not necessarily related to any interest in land and gave
rise to a right of action only in the sovereign under its police pow-
ers, regardless of whether the act was also in violation of criminal
statutes.
Public nuisance law has expanded immensely over the years
and now is a catch-all legal label for "everything that endangers
life or health, gives offense to sense, violates the laws of decency,
or obstructs reasonable and comfortable use of property." ' As a
result of vague judicial and legislative definitions of what consti-
""A 'private nuisance' exists only where one is injured in relation to a right
which he enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land." Croughwell v.
Chase Brass & Copper Co., 128 Conn. 110, 20 A.2d 619 (1941). A private nuisance
"affects a single individual or a determinate number of persons in the enjoyment
of some private right not common to the public." Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse
Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 741, 107 P.2d 501, 504 (1940).
3
"A 'private nuisance' is actionable invasion of interests in the use and enjoy-
ment of land, and is usually by intangible substances, such as noises or odors, and
usually involves the idea of continuance or recurrence over a considerable period
of time." Ryan v. Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
Pottock v. Continental Can Co., 42 Del. Ch. 360, 211 A.2d 622 (1965).
'McAlester v. King, 317 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1957).
'Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452, 257 N.E.2d
870 (1970).
7RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, supra note 1, at 217.
$id.
'Hall v. Putney, 291 Ill. App. 508, 516, 10 N.E.2d 204, 207 (1937). "A public
nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the
safety, health or morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance, incon-
venience, or injury to the public." Echave v. Grand Junction, 118 Col. 165, 193 P.2d
277 (Colo. 1948).
[Vol. 76
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tutes a public nuisance, recent cases have involved such diverse
matters as live sex shows,10 the improper practice of optometry,'1
the public exhibition of snakes,' 2 and usurious small loan
businesses.' 3 In addition to public and private nuisances, there is
the hybrid "mixed nuisance," damaging to the public in general
and also to the land rights of an individual. 4
Four remedies are available to individuals who are harmed by
nuisances. Self-help, the use of reasonable measures by adversely
affected parties, is still recognized today,'5 and equitable remedies
are available to abate a nuisance. 8 Past damages, 7 as well as
permanent damages,'" are also proper remedies for nuisance.
As noted above, any proper government agency, under its po-
lice powers, can initiate proceedings to enjoin a public nuisance.,,
The problem, however, involves the standing of private individuals
to sue for public nuisance. 0 Generally, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, a public nuisance gives rise to no action in law or
'"People ex rel. Hicks v. "Sarong Gals," 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414
(1972).
"Delaware Optometric Ass'n v. Sherwood. 11 Del. Ch. 507, 122 A.2d 424 (1956).
'
2Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1956), cert. denied, 88 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1956).
'"State ex rel Burgum v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957).
"Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 75 P.2d 30 (1938); Riggins v. District Ct.,
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).
"Fletcher's Gin,, Inc. v. Crihfield, 423 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1970); Cook Indus.
v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Corentin v. Columbia, 29 Conn.
Supp. 499, 294 A.2d 80 (1972).
"National Ass'n of Letter Carrriers AFL-CIO v. Independent Postal System of
Am., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Okla. 1971); United States v. Bishop Processing
Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968). Equity cannot enjoin criminal violations
except where a statute also terms them a nuisance. To do so would be a denial of
due process because the quantum of proof required in equity proceedings is only
the preponderance of the evidence for clear and convincing evidence] instead of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and because there is no jury. People v. Goldman,
7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972).
"Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir.
1971); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964).
"Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452, 257 N.E.2d
870 (1970). The Boomer decision has been the subject of considerable controversy.
See, e.g., Note, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (1970); Comment, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 312
(1970); Comment, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 356 (1971); Comment, 39 FORmHANS L.
REv. 338 (1970); Comment, 19 KAN. L. REv. 549 (1971); Comment, 49 N.C.L. REV.
402 (1971); Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 919 (1970).
"See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R. 699 (1930).
"See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1004-08.
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equity by one who suffers an injliry which is common to the pub-
lic.2 '
II. THE "SPECIAL INJURY" RULE
There are two major exceptions to the rule that denies stand-
ing to individuals to sue for public nuisance: (1) Special injury to
personal or land rights; and (2) morally offensive nuisances and
other statutory standing rights. The most important exception is
the "special injury" rule. Simply stated, where an individual
plaintiff suffers damages surpassing those of the general public,
then the plaintiff has standing to sue. The issue of "special injury"
has long troubled both courts and commentators. Essentially, the
issue has been whether a plaintiff must show damages of a distinct
kind, damages of a greater degree, or both. Although Dean Prosser
has suggested that the key is the "distinct kind of damage rather
than degree, 2 2 the question is still largely unresolved.
The California Court of Appeals, in Venuto v. Owen-Corning
Fiberglass Corp.," adopted the approach suggested by Dean Pros-
ser, which is the majority rule today. In this case, four plaintiffs
who were residents of Santa Clara sued a fiberglass manufacturing
plant, alleging that emissions from the plant were seriously pollut-
ing the air, thus constituting a public nuisance. The plaintiffs
sought an injunction and damages; they claimed that they were
particularly harmed because the nuisance aggravated respiratory
2 Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971). This well-
settled common law rule has been expressly codified in many jurisdictions. "A
private person may maintain an action for public nuisance, if it is specifically
injurious to himself but not otherwise." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3493 (1973). For similar
statutory language, see ALASKA STAT. § 9.45.230 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 72-103
(1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 21-10
(1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 7.48.010 (1961). Compare the less specific language
in the Alabama statute: "Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance
is one which damages all persons which come within the sphere of its operation
.... Generally a public nuisance gives no right of action to an individual." ALA.
CODE tit. 7, § 1084 (1960). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-310 (1969); DEL.
CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 7102 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 52-102 (1957); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
100 1/2, §§ 1, 26 (Smith-Hurd 1935); IOWA CODE ANN. 657.1 (1950); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 13:4711 (1968); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 122 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.380 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-
3-1 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1016 (1965); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2a:130-2
(1969); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4664 (1952).
22Prosser, supra note 1, at 1011.
222 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1971).
[Vol. 76
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disorders and allergies suffered by each of them and because the
pollutants obscured each plaintiffs view of the scenic Santa Clara
Valley, for which each plaintiff alleged he was paying higher rent.
In affirming the trial court's general demurrer, the court of
appeals concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege injury of a
different kind than that suffered by the general public, and there-
fore, they lacked standing. As to the claim of respiratory injury,
the court stated that "where personal discomfort is the basis of the
complaint, the test of liability is the effect of the alleged interfer-
ence on the comfort of normal persons of ordinary sensibilities in
the community."24 The court also rejected the obstruction of view
argument, concluding that this was not an interference with a
known property right.
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the "degree" test in
Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co." In this
case, a real estate developer of Sun City, a senior citizen com-
munity, sought to enjoin an adjacent cattle feeding operation be-
cause of flies and odors. In affirming a permanent injunction, the
court said that "the difference between a private nuisance and a
public nuisance is generally one of degree." 6 The court termed the
condition a public nuisance without a detailed consideration of the
plaintiff's standing to sue.
In Clabaugh v. Harris," an Ohio court adopted the most strin-
gent standing rule, one that requires a plaintiff to show an injury
different in both kind and degree. In this case, residents of a farm
community sought to enjoin highway construction work during late
night and early morning hours due to the noise and vibration of
large numbers of trucks. The court, in denying the injunction,
stated that an injunction would only issue if four elements were
met: (1) The plaintiffs' rights were clear; (2) a nuisance was clearly
established; (3) the legal rights of the plaintiffs were substantially
affected by the nuisance; and (4) the plaintiffs would suffer irre-
parable injury. As to the particular damage issue, the court stated
"Id. at 126, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
2108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972); Note, 55 UTAH L. REv. 74 (1973).
1108 Ariz. at 183, 494 P.2d at 705.
127 Ohio Misc. 153, 273 N.E.2d 923 (C.P. 1971). West Virginia also has adopted
a stringent standing rule. In International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888,
892, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1944), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated
that "a private individual can maintain an action for relief against a public nui-
sance only when he has suffered therefrom an injury different from that inflicted
upon the public in general, not only in degree, but in character."
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that a plaintiff has no right to the abatement of a public nuisance
unless his or her injury is of a different kind and degree than that
of the general public.
The Florida District Court of Appeals took a major step to-
ward the elimination of the restrictive "special injury" rule in Save
Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp." Although still pend-
ing before the Florida Supreme Court, this case established Florida
as the first American jurisdiction to repudiate the special injury
rule.29
In Save Sand Key, a non-profit citizens group sought to enjoin
United States Steel from interfering with the alleged vested rights
of its members to the use of a beach. The citizens group alleged
that a purpesture erected by the company blocked the enjoyment
of these rights. 0 In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the ac-
tion, the appellate court began by tracing the historical roots of the
special injury rule. The court noted that the rule was enacted to
avoid multiplicity of actions, "the theory being that the threat of
multipliciousness in such cases is a greater evil than the nui-
sance." 3 ' They went on to indicate that relief had to be sought from
the appropriate public official or, if need be, from the ballot box.2
Judge McNulty, speaking for the court, observed that experi-
ence indicated old remedies to be ineffective, depriving an individ-
ual of standing to sue if his injury was suffered jointly with the
public. "But," said the court, "it is anathema to any true system
of justice to proclaim that a right may be enjoyed by all yet none
may protect it."' 3
1281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. granted, November 21, 1973 (Fla. S.
Ct.).2
'In so doing the court specifically overruled Askew v. Hold The Bulkhead
-Save Our Bays, 269 So. 2d 696 (Fla. App. 1972). In that case, plaintiffs who
sought relief on behalf of the public from the commercial exploitation of a public
park were denied standing.
3
'Cf. Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County, 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1973) (injunction by state barring company from obstructing use of a public
beach affirmed). When the state initiates the action, injunctive relief may be more
easily obtained.
11281 So. 2d at 573. Quite apart from the policy of judicial restraint adopted
by the courts in public nuisance actions is an historical consideration that dates
back to early common law England. "The reasons for the requirement of particular
damage have been stated many times. The plaintiff did not and could not represent
the King, and the vindication of royal rights was properly left to his duly consti-
tuted officers." Prosser, supra note 1, at 1007.
2281 So. 2d at 574.
wId.
[Vol. 76
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss4/4
PUBLIC NUISANCE
The trend in Florida and the federal courts has been to
broaden standing to sue on a number of causes of action. Based
upon this apparent trend, the court concluded that standing in
nuisance cases should also be broadened, stating that "it is time
to say. . . that the 'special injury' concept serves no valid purpose
in the present structure of the law and should no longer be a viable
expedient to the disposition of these cases. '34 The court rejected
the multipliciousness argument, citing the expense of litigation,
the precedential value of prior decided cases, and the increasing
number of class actions as factors that would reduce multiple suits.
As noted above, this case is now pending before the Florida Su-
preme Court, and it is not clear whether the District Court of
Appeals decision will be affirmed. In any event, this case is an
indication that the archaic special injury rule may soon be out-
moded.3
A. What Constitutes Special Injury?
Every American jurisdiction, except perhaps Florida, requires
an individual plaintiff to show special injury before acquiring
standing to sue for public nuisance . 3 Although the practical effect
of the special injury rule has been to limit the standing of individu-
als, it has not eliminated individual standing. Regardless of the
type of special injury required by a jurisdiction-distinct kind,
different kind, or kind and degree-individual plaintiffs have been
able to demonstrate the requisite quantum of personal injury.
There are two types of special injury by which a plaintiff may
have standing. The first type, when the nuisance has resulted in
personal harm to the plaintiff, is least likely to occur and is diffi-
cult to prove, but it is the "true" special injury. In George v.
Houston," for example, the parents of a deceased child, who
drowned in a pond located on land used by the city of Houston for
garbage disposal, sued the city on the theory that the garbage
uId. at 575.
The decision in Save Sand Key was followed in Save Our Bay, Inc. v. County
Poll. Control Comm'n, 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. App. 1973). The court held that a
nonprofit corporation whose members used waters for recreation had standing to
bring an action against utilities who allegedly polluted the waters.
"Florida may be the first jurisdiction to reject this rule. See notes 28-35 supra
and accompanying text.
31465 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 479 S.W.2d
257 (1972).
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dump was a public nuisance. 8 The court ruled that the personal
injury suffered by the plaintiffs' decedent constituted special in-
jury, and, thus, the plaintiffs had standing.
A somewhat more unusual situation confronted the Oregon
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Parent39 when a woman sued for an
injunction against her son-in-law, who allegedly was creating a
public nuisance by the continual use of obscene words and gestures
against the plaintiff in public. The court ruled that the plaintiff
did suffer damages of a different kind and degree from the public
in general because the obscene words and gestures were directed
at her personally.
The second type of special injury recognized by the courts is
injury to a plaintiff's land. This concept is identical to what is
sometimes termed a mixed nuisance," and is used by courts that
have not adopted the terminology of mixed nuisance. At the heart
of the standing exception for mixed nuisance and special injury to
land is the assumption that a plaintiff could bring an action for
private nuisance, notwithstanding the public nature of the nui-
sance. In Wade v. Campbell,4' several landowners sought damages
and an injunction against an adjacent dairy farmer, alleging that
the dairy farm caused noxious and nauseating odors, large num-
bers of flies and mosquitoes, excessive dust, and disturbing animal
noises. The court, in affirming an injunction against the dairy
farm, used the special injury to land approach: "While the condi-
tions created and maintained by defendants on their property are
sufficient to constitute a continuing and public nuisance affecting
a considerable number of persons in the community, the plaintiffs,
as near residents and property owners were specially injured
thereby. '4 2
A similar approach was used by the court in Weinstein v. Lake
Pearl Park, Inc.43 In this case, landowners bounded by a great pond
brought an action against an adjoining owner who had put fill into
the pond without a license, causing flooding on the plaintiffs' land.
"J'he pond was alleged to be an "attractive nuisance." For a discussion of the
law of attractive nuisance, see generally W. PROSSER, ThE LAW OF ToRTs 372-85 (3d
ed. 1964).
11228 Ore. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
"See Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 75 P.2d 30 (1938).
"200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
"19 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
"1347 Mass. 91, 196 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
[Vol. 76
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss4/4
PUBLIC NUISANCE
The court, in holding for the plaintiffs, found that placing fill in a
great pond without a license is a public wrong for which a private
action will not lie absent "special and peculiar" damage. The
court, however, concluded that the wetting of plaintiffs' lands by
the nuisance constituted special injury. Identical reasoning has
been used to give standing to individual plaintiffs suing for mixed
nuisance. In Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis,44 a group of plaintiffs
sought to perpetually enjoin the defendant from operating a pro-
cessing plant. The plant processed about 35,000 tons of animal by-
products annually. The plaintiffs' primary objection to the pro-
cessing plant was the stench that it generated. The plaintiffs intro-
duced evidence that an obnoxious odor permeated the air for more
than a mile from the plant, causing headaches, throat irritations,
loss of appetite, nausea and other discomforts. The court noted
that when a nuisance is both public and private in character, it is
termed mixed. It stated that a public nuisance could be enjoined
by an individual if the nuisance injured or impaired the value of
his property. The court concluded "that whether the conduct of
the appellant's business be determined as constituting a public or
a private nuisance, the appellees have shown sufficient discomfort
to themselves and injury to their properties to entitle them to
injunctive relief."4
HI. ALTERNATIVE STANDING PossmmrrIms
A. Morally Offensive Nuisances
Under common law, various types of conduct were deemed to
be public nuisances per se.46 These noxious or morally offensive
nuisances could not only be enjoined by the appropriate public
official, but were also subject to suit by an individual. Today,
while the list of per se nuisances has expanded greatly and varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a majority of states still permit
private citizens to seek injunctive relief from an unlawful or mor-
ally offensive nuisance. The three main types of nuisances that can
be enjoined by a private action are houses of prostitution, gam-
bling halls, and the illegal production and distribution of liquor. 7
"1213 Md. 465, 132 A.2d 445 (1957).
11Id. at 474, 132 A.2d at 449.
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 201 (1965).
"Private actions are maintainable against morally offensive conduct pursuant
to: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-101, 102 (1962 Replacement Volume) (roadhouses, dance
halls, nudist camps); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7102 (1953) (lewdness, assignation,
9
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Most other illegal activities may be enjoined only by a designated
public official.
Even if an individual has the right to enjoin a morally offen-
sive nuisance, this right is often limited in one way or another. In
some jurisdictions, a per se nuisance suit may only be brought by
a citizen of the locality where the nuisance exists.4" In other juris-
dictions, the plaintiff must be joined in the action by a minimum
number of other complainants." Finally, a security bond may be
statutorily mandated or discretionary with the court.50
Although suits by individuals on behalf of the state to enjoin
morally offensive nuisances have been successful,5' the mere fact
prostitution); ME. REy. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2741 (1965) (prostitution, gambling,
illegal sale of liquor or drugs); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 27A.3801 (1972 Replace-
ment Volume) (gambling, prostitution, sale of illegal drugs and liquor); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 95-3-11 (1973) (gambling); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.940 (1953) (prostitu-
tion); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-1002 (1969) (opium, prostitution, gambling);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-17 (1971) (prostitution, lewdness, illegal manufacture
and distribution of liquor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-8-1 (1972 2d Replacement
Volume) (unlawful conduct injurious to 'public morals, safety, health or welfare);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2 (1965) (prostitution, gambling); N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-1-
1 (1968) (any act offending decency); Osio REV. CODE ANN. § 37.3767.01 (1971
Replacement Volume) (lewdness, assignation, gambling, pornography, prostitu-
tion); R.I. GEM. LAWS ANN. § 10-1-1 (1970) (prostitution, gambling, illegal sale of
liquors, slaughterhouses, rendering plants); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1801 (1962)
(prostitution); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 21-10-10 (1967) (prostitution); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 23-301 (1955) (liquors, gambling, prostitution); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 47-1-1 (1970) (brothels); VA. CODE ANN. § 48.7 (1972) (prostitution); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-9-1 (1966) (lewdness, prostitution, assignation, gambling);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-453 (1959) (lewdness, prostitution, assignation, gambling).
"Residency requirements are contained in: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-113 (1962)
(citizen of county); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 7103 (1953) (citizen of county); IDAHO
CODE § 52-204 (1957) (citizen of county); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4711 et seq. (1968)
(resident of election district for gambling only). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2741
(1965) (voter in county); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.380 et seq. (1968) (citizen
of county); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1004 (1969) (citizen of county); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 37.3767 (Baldwin 1971) (citizen of county); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-
301 et seq. (1955) (citizens of county); UTAH ConE ANN. § 47-1-2 (1970) (citizens
of county).
"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-102 (1962) (five or more citizens or freeholders); LA.
REV. STAT. § 13:4722 (1968) (10 residents for gambling); ME. REy. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 2741 (1965) (seven voters); TENN. COD ANN. § 23-302 (1955) (10 citizens or
freeholders); VA. COD ANN. § 48.1 (1972) (five or more citizens).
5 Posting of bond: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-103 (1962) (required); LA. REy.
STAT. § 13:4715 (1968) (showing of good faith); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.140 (1953)
(court's discretion); OHIo REv. CoDEANN. § 37:3767.03 (Baldwin 1971) (required);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-304 (1955) (required).
5See, e.g., State ex rel. Leahy v. O'Rourke, 115 Mont. 502, 146 P.2d 168 (1944)
[Vol. 76
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that the state declares an activity to be illegal does not confer
standing on an individual to sue for its abatement, absent specific
statutory language to the contrary." Similarly, the existence of a
public nuisance is not necessarily a basis for civil damages.53
B. Environmental Legislation
In the last five years most states have enacted new environ-
mental protection laws. Although the purpose of this article is not
to examine at great length either state or federal environmental
protection legislation, these statutes have had a significant effect
on the rights of individuals to seek relief from environmental nui-
sances. Consequently, a brief look at the standing provisions of
various statutes is helpful.
There are four major-federal anti-pollution or environmental
acts. 4 In each act, private citizens have been granted only "sec-
ondary" standing rights; that is, standing only to attack the inap-
propriate action or inaction of a designated federal official. The
National Environmental Policy Act 55 gives standing to private citi-
zens to challenge the validity of impact statements issued pur-
suant to title forty two, section 4332 of the United States Code, 6
(gambling nuisance); Caravella v. State ex rel. Holcomb, 185 Miss. 1, 186 So. 653
(1939) (liquor sales and gambling).
512See, e.g., Parker v. Lowery, 446 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1969), in which an individ-
ual was found to lack standing to sue to enjoin gambling at a carnival, despite a
state statute that declared gambling to be a per se nuisance.
53See, e.g., Fitzwater v. Sunset Empire, Inc., 502 P.2d 214 (Ore. 1972), in which
a plaintiff who had slipped and fallen on ice on a public sidewalk in front of the
defendant's restaurant sought damages for his injury. The Astoria, Oregon, city
code stated that a violation of the snow removal ordinance, conceded to be violated
in this case, constituted a public nuisance. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the
city ordinance did not create a cause of action for third parties, but only for the
city.54For a complete list of federal statutes and a description of each, see STAFF OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss., A
COMPILATION OF FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
NATION'S FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND
OCEANOGRAPHY (Comm. Print 1973). See also Morgenstern, The Relationship Be-
tween Federal and State Laws to Control and Prevent Pollution, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL
L. 238 (1971); Note, The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 40
TENN. L. REV. 538 (1973); Note, Survey of Environmental Legislation, 26 U. MIAMI
L. REV.778 (1972).
-42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1973).
51A great deal of litigation has resulted from this standing provision. See
generally Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970);
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and the Clean Air Act 7 provides for the standing of individuals to
challenge the non-discretionary acts of the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.). "8 Similarly, the Water
Pollution Control Act55 grants private parties secondary standing
rights."' Finally, while the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (also
known as the Refuse Act)61 contains no specific reference to citizen
suits, private suits brought under this Act have been permitted by
some courts.62
Generally speaking, state environmental legislation has given
individual citizens only "secondary" standing rights. In other
words, in most jurisdictions the job of abating environmental nui-
sances has been given to a specific public agency" with private
Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Analysis and Judicial
Interpretation, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 71 (1973); Note, Environmental Law: Standing
to Challenge Federal Agency Action Under National Environmental Protection Act,
57 MINN. L. REV. 404 (1972).
742 U.S.C. § 1857 (1974).
"'See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857h-2, 1857h-5 (Supp. 1974). See generally Juergens-
meyer, Control of Air Pollution through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 1126 (1967); Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional
Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J. 153 (1972); Greco, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970:
Better Automotive Ideasfrom Congress, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 384 (1971); Com-
ment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1254 (1970); Note, Rule 23 Class Action Enforcement of the Clean Air Act of
1970, 7 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 549 (1973); Note, Environmental Law-Air Pollution
Abatement-A Supplemental Damage Remedy Under the Clean Air Act, 75W. VA.
L. REV. 266 (1973).
5933 U.S.C. § 1251 (1974).
"See generally Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wisc. L,
REV. 738 (1971); McThenia, Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195 (1973); Note, Private Reme-
dies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970); Note, The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10
HARV. J. LEGIs. 565 (1973); Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance
Actions, 79 YALE L.J. 102 (1969).
"133 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
"
2See generally Lazarus, Private Relief Under the Refuse Act, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS 250 (1972); Note, Environmental Law-Private Remedies for Pollution of
Navigable Waters, 50 N.C.L. REV. 153 (1971); Note, Environmental Law-Private
Cause of Action Under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 for Injury
to the Ecology of Navigable Waters, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1255 (1972).
'The limiting clause of the Maryland Air Pollution Control Act is typical.
"Persons other than the State shall not acquire actionable rights by virtue of this
subtitle. The basis for proceedings or other actions . . . shall inure solely to and
shall be for the benefit of the people of the State generally and is not intended to
create in any way new or enlarged rights or to enlarge existing rights." MD. ANN.
CODE. art. 43, § 699 (1971). For similar language, see ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.870
[Vol. 76
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actions possible only when the duly constituted public agency has
failed to act or has expressly approved of the private suit." Under
the Florida Environmental Protection Act, for example, private
parties have the right to compel state government agencies, by writ
of mandamus, to enforce laws "for the protection of the air, water,
and natural resources .... 65 Florida citizens also have standing to
intervene in administrative licensing proceedings when environ-
mental interests are affected.6 In New York, individual citizens
can maintain actions to preserve mineral resources by enjoining
waste. An individual citizen can only obtain standing, however,
after a complaint has been filed with the Attorney General and he
has failed to bring the action within ten days. 7 In Massachusetts,
any private action against air pollution can be maintained, but
only with the consent of the Board of Health. 8
In three other states, administrative agencies bear the primary
responsibility for abating environmental nuisances, but the ena-
bling statutes have also given secondary rights to private individu-
als. Under New Mexico's Air Quality Act, private individuals, or
representatives in a class action, may seek a declaratory judgment
to determine the validity or applicability of an environmental com-
mission regulation. 9 In Illinois, court relief may be sought after a
plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies before the
state environmental board.70 Finally, under Indiana law, a private
(1971); IowA CODE ANN. § 25.455B (1971); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 65-3019 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 203.170 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2001 et seq.
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3421 (1973). See generally Note, State Legislation
to Grant Standing: Questions, Answers and Alternatives, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 42
(1971).
'Private actions, although limited in one way or another, are provided for
under the following statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (Supp. 1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 1001 et seq. (Smith-
Hurd 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3501 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111,
§ 169 (1954) (water); Ch. 111, § 142(a) (Supp. 1967) (air); MICH. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1201 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-14-1 et seq. (1968); N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
LAW § 71-1311 (McKinney 1971).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1973). (Before writ may issue, private party com-
plainant must notify agency, which has 30 days to take appropriate action). See
generally Finell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Land and Water Management Act
of 1972, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 103 (1973).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.414. Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3501 (1973).
"N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 17-1311 (McKinney 1971).
"MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 142A (1971).
"N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-14-1 (1968).
7 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1045 (Supp. 1973). See generally Klein,
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party has standing to bring an action on behalf of the state for
equitable relief, but only after written notice has been filed with
the Board of Health and the Department of Natural Resources,
and neither agency has taken action within 180 days."
Connecticut, Michigan, and Minnesota are three states that
provide an independent right of action for private persons against
environmental nuisances." In each state, the legislature has ex-
pressly declared that the environment can best be protected by
private as well as governmental action. For example, the Minne-
sota Environmental Rights Act of 1971 provides: "The legislature
finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to the
protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land and
other natural resources. . . .Accordingly, it is in the public inter-
est to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land,
and other natural resources located within the state from pollu-
tion, impairment, or destruction. '7 3 In all three states, individuals,
associations, and partnerships may seek judicial relief without any
major standing limitations. The courts are then empowered to
fashion injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief to abate
environmental nuisances. In addition, the Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act provides for court appointment of an envi-
ronmental expert to study the situation and suggest proper judicial
remedies. 5
Pollution Control in Illinois-The Formulative Years, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 759
(1973); Polelle, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act: Constitutional Twilight
Zone of Criminal and Civil Law, 61 ILL. B.J. 584 (1973).
71IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3501 (Supp. 1972).
"Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a (Supp. 1973); Michigan Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental
Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 (1973); Minnesota Envi.
ronmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116(B).01 (1973).
"
3 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (1973). Identical language is found in the Michi-
gan statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 (1973). See generally Note, The
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1972); Note, The
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency-A Study in State Administrative Law, 56
MINN. L. REV. 997 (1972).
'The Connecticut statute provides: "The court may grant temporary and per-
manent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions on the defendant as are
required to protect the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of
the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(a) (1973). See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 (1973);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (1973).
"See generally Lohrmann, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines
and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1970); Sax,
[Vol. 76
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There is little doubt that federal and state environmental leg-
islation holds the greatest potential for preventing or remedying
various interferences with the health, safety, and welfare of indi-
viduals and the public. In the interim, however, there are two
major weaknesses in most state environmental statutes. First, as
noted above, very few jurisdictions have granted unconditional
standing to private parties. Second, the possible application of the
pre-emption doctrine threatens to leave litigants without a proper
remedy.
In Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp.,"5 for example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to allow the state to enjoin
a company's burning of coal refuse that caused air pollution be-
cause the state air pollution control act had allegedly pre-empted
the field. The court held that an injunction would only lie if pursu-
ing the statutory remedy would cause irreparable injury. 7 It should
be readily apparent that the use of pre-emption rationale on pri-
vate litigants is a distinct possibility because courts have been
reluctant historically to grant private citizens standing in public
nuisance or environmental actions, regardless of the legal ration-
ale."6
At the federal level, despite the vast number of new environ-
mental statutes, the Supreme Court has recently declared that
these new acts have not totally pre-empted the federal common
law of nuisance. 9 In Illinois v. Milwaukee"0 Illinois sought to invoke
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MicH. L.
REv. 575 (1972).
"1418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965).
"The Pennsylvania law has been subsequently amended to permit equitable
remedies by the state. See Borough of Brookhaven v. American Rendering, Inc., 434
Pa. 290, 256 A.2d 626 (1969).
"But cf. G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379
(Alas. 1974). In this case, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Alaska Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation did not have primary jurisdiction over all
actions for the abatement of environmental nuisances. Even though the Alaska
statute did not confer standing on individuals who would not otherwise have stand-
ing to sue, it did not preclude private persons from maintaining common law
actions. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.870(c) (Supp. 1973) provides: "This chapter does not
estop the state, persons or political subdivisions of the state in the exercise of their
rights to suppress nuisances, to seek damages, or to otherwise abate or recover for
the effects of pollution or other environmental degradation." See also White Lake
Improvement Ass'n v. Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
"See generally Note, State Ecological Rights Arising Under Federal Common
Law, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 597 (1972).
"406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in a
suit against four Wisconsin cities and the sewerage commissions of
the city and county of Milwaukee. The suit was for abatement of
a public nuisance, based on the defendants' alleged pollution of
Lake Michigan. According to the plaintiff, more than 200 million
gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage was being discharged
daily into the lake. The Supreme Court, in remitting the parties
to the appropriate federal district court, stated that federal ques-
tion jurisdiction under title twenty-eight, section 1331 of the
United States Code "will support claims founded upon federal
common law as well as those of statutory origin." 8' In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on two earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.82 and North Dakota v.
Minnesota,8 in addition to a recent Tenth Circuit case, Texas v.
Pankey.5 4 With respect to the pre-emption question, Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote for a unanimous Court: "It may happen that new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the
field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that time comes
to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities
of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollu-
tion."" The significance of this case, however, should not be over-
estimated. In all likelihood, this decision will be limited to instan-
ces of interstate pollution. Furthermore, the decision does nothing
to resolve the threshold standing requirements that effectively bar
private litigants.
C. Joinder of the State as a Party
There are several other standing possibilities that involve join-
der of parties. The first of these is an individual's suit on behalf of
the state to have a public nuisance abated. Only Florida and
Wisconsin permit a citizen to sue on behalf of the state to enjoin a
public nuisance. Under Florida law, any citizen within the county
8
'Id. at 100.
-206 U.S. 230 (1907).
'263 U.S. 365 (1923).
A4441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
91406 U.S. at 107.
"This is virtually the same type of suit as an individual's suit for the abatement
of a morally offensive, or per se, nuisance. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying
text. It should be noted, however, that where an individual plaintiff elects to sue
on his own behalf, as would be required in a suit for damages, every jurisdiction
(except possibly Florida) requires that a plaintiff demonstrate special injury. See
notes 22-45 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76
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where a public nuisance exists may seek injunctive relief in the
name of the state."7 Florida defines a public nuisance as that
"which tends to annoy the community or injure the health of the
citizens in general, or to corrupt the public morals." s In Wiscon-
sin, private citizens may maintain an action to enjoin public nui-
sances, even if they are not citizens of the county where the nui-
sance exists, after first obtaining leave from the court. The statute
provides that "an action to enjoin a public nuisance may be com-
menced and prosecuted in the name of the state, either by the
attorney general upon his own information . . . or upon the rela-
tion of a private individual, the sewerage commission, or a county,
having first obtained leave therefor from the court." 9
In the other forty-eight states, an individual does not have
standing to sue on behalf of the state to abate a public nuisance.
The majority position is stated in Garland Grain Co. v. D-C Home
Owners Improvement Association:"
Though a nuisance may be public, it furnishes an individ-
ual no right of action, unless he has in some way been actually
injured or will suffer such an injury by its maintenance. No one
can constitute himself a guardian of the public and maintain
an action for public nuisance which does not sensibly injure him
or his property, although he be a member of the community
where such nuisance exists. The rights of the general public are
not involved unless the state-the custodian of those rights-is
made a party to the suit. Absent such view of the statute, the
public policy of our own state on such vital matters could be
thwarted, without the state having had an opportunity to have
its side of the controversy presented in a court of justice.'
Because the government has freer access to the courts in pub-
lic nuisance suits than do individual plaintiffs, and inasmuch as
the state and individual plaintiffs often have a common interest
in the abatement of a public nuisance, it is understandable that
private citizens would attempt to circumvent the traditional
standing obstacles by suing jointly with the state. Nevertheless, as
a rule, courts have required that all plaintiffs in a public nuisance
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (Supp. 1972).
T
-1d. § 823.01(1).
"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.02 (Supp. 1973).
"393 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1965).
"Id. at 640. The court does suggest, however, that actual injury is not necessary
in order to have standing, but only that an individual "will suffer" an injury from
the nuisance. See notes 22-45 supra and accompanying text.
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suit have an independent basis for standing.
In Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District v. Zykan,92 the sewer
district and owners of homes in a subdivision brought a joint action
to compel the developer of the subdivision to construct a drainage
ditch and for damages arising from the failure to construct the
ditch. The sewer district sued on behalf of the citizens of St. Louis
County and the State of Missouri, alleging that failure to construct
the storm sewers interfered with drainage, caused ponding and
pooling of water, and land erosion, all of which created a public
nuisance and caused a diminution of land value.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiffs, rejected the defendant's assertion that there was a mis-
joinder of parties and actions. The court stated that "the equity
relief thus sought by all plaintiffs arises 'out of the same transac-
tion, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences' and pre-
sents questions of law and fact 'common to all.' Joinder is permis-
sible when these conditions exist, and it is not necessary that all
plaintiffs 'be interested in obtaining . . . all the relief de-
manded.' ,,' The misjoinder argument primarily related to the
joinder of a suit for an injunction with a suit for damages. The
homeowners had at least two bases for having standing: First, the
failure to construct the ditch was a breach of contract, and second,
they suffered an injury to land, thus acquiring standing under the
special injury doctrine. 4
There do appear to be some minor advantages for private
citizens maintaining a joint suit with the state for public nuisance.
One advantage is the legal aid and advice that may be forthcoming
from the state directly relating to the litigation of the case. Another
advantage is the intangible benefit to an individual citizen when
the state, in effect, expressly endorses the suit by jointly suing for
abatement of the nuisance.
D. Class Actions
The final type of private action for public nuisance is the class
action." Although several commentators have noted the great po-
92495 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1973).
'
3Id. at 652.
"See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
"
5Another type of action similar to a class action is a parens patriae suit initi-
ated by the state on behalf of its citizens. Parens patriae is not discussed at great
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tential of the class action in nuisance and environmental cases,"
as a practical matter, class actions based on a public nuisance
theory have been an almost total failure. There are two apparent
reasons for the failure of class action nuisance suits. First, the
plaintiffs must overcome all of the basic standing obstacles that
thwart individual plaintiffs, such as the special injury rule. Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs must overcome the pitfalls associated with all
class actions such as class composition and representation,
manageability, injury in fact, and, in the federal courts, jurislic-
tional amount.,"
Diamond v. General Motors Corp." is an example of an ingen-
ious, but unsuccessful, class action based on the theory of public
nuisance. In this case, the plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and
all other residents of Los Angeles County (7,119,184 persons)
against 293 corporations and municipalities for alleged pollution of
the atmosphere.9 The plaintiff argued that the class combined all
of the special damage claims of the individual residents. Among
the injuries alleged by the plaintiff were a shortening of life span,
increased chances of suffering heart attack, emphysema, lung can-
cer, damage to and destruction of body tissue, eye irritation, brain
damage, exhaustion due to lack of oxygen, and fatigue. The appel-
late court, in affirming the trial court's dismissal, stated that the
class action was not maintainable for three reasons. First, there
were significantly disparate interests within the alleged class. Sec-
ond, the right to recovery and amount of recovery to individual
plaintiffs against individual defendants would have to be sepa-
length here because it is a public, rather than a private action. Although historically
parens patriae suits have been successful in cases involving interstate pollution, it
is well-settled that "tihe status of parens patriae cannot be used to substitute
for a class action as to individual claims of the residents of political subdivision."
In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970). For a discussion of what constitutes a valid parens patriae suit, see Hawaii
v. Standard Oil, 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969).
"See, e.g., Note, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation,
2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1973).
"See generally, Comment, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action
-Catch 22 in Rule 23, 10 HoUSTON L. REv. 337 (1973).
"120 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
"Cf. Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972). A parens
patriae suit was brought by the city on the basis of the Illinois common law of strict
products liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, stat-
ing that the Air Quality Act of 1967 (amended as the "Clean Air Act") resulted in
federal preemption of the area of emissions control.
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rately litigated. Third, the number of parties, interests, and issues
were unmanageable.
Even though the overwhelming majority of class actions have
been unsuccessful, there have been a few exceptions. In Biechele
v. Norfolk & Western Railway,' the residents of the Sandusky,
Ohio, area sued the railroad seeking damages and an injunction
against coal dust pollution. The class action was originally filed in
state court, but removed to the district court on diversity grounds.
After publication of the suit, 731 plaintiffs sought entry into the
case, 532 withdrew, and thousands of others did nothing. The dis-
trict court ruled that the class action could be properly maintained
and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the injunction suit and
pendent jurisdiction to hear the suit for damages. The court held
that "the right of each member of the class to live in an environ-
ment free from excessive coal dust and conversely, the right of
defendant to operate its coal loading facility are both in excess of
$10,000. '11,
As to the merits of the case, the plaintiffs introduced evidence
that black, greasy dirt accumulated on sidewalks, porches, outdoor
furniture and cars. The coal dust also ruined the paint on homes
and damaged interior furnishings. The court, in holding for the
plaintiffs on all claims, stated:
It is possible that this Court has the burden of deciding whether
the plaintiffs must continue to suffer in defendant's filth, or
become citizens of a ghost town on an abandoned railway line
and a silted-up harbor. If so, the latter seems the lesser of two
evils, especially in view of the maxim "sufficient unto the day
is the evil thereof.' '10 2
The vitality of the Biechele decision was, unfortunately, com-
pletely destroyed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Zahn
v. International Paper Co."0 3 In Zahn, the Court upheld the dis-
missal of a class action brought by owners of property along the
shores of Lake Champlain in Vermont against the International
Paper Company for alleged pollution of the lake. The district court
had dismissed the action because, although each named plaintiff
satisfied the statutory requirement of ten thousand dollars dam-
'1309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
1111d. at 355.
111d. at 358.
1-414 U.S. 812 (1973).
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ages, not all members of the class had suffered damages in excess
of the jurisdictional amount.04 The Second Circuit had affirmed." 5
Mr. Justice White, speaking for a divided Court, and relying pri-
marily on Snyder v. Harris,"8 stated that separate and distinct
claims cannot be aggregated to meet the ten thousand dollars re-
quired for diversity jurisdiction: "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b) (3)
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plain-
tiff who does not must be dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff
may not ride in on another's coattails.' "107
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Justice Marshall, dissented. The dissenters argued that if named
plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional amount, then the court had
ancillary jurisdiction to entertain the claims of other members of
a class. Mr. Justice Brennan cited a number of other instances in
which federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction over additional
parties.08 The dissent suggested that "[c]lass actions under Rule
23(b)(3) are equally appropriate for such treatment."'' 9
The significance of the Zahn decision should not be underesti-
mated. It is clearly the most important class action case since
Snyder v. Harris."0 Not only has the Supreme Court declared that
all plaintiffs in a class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases, but footnote eleven of the majority opin-
ion plainly suggests that the requirement that all plaintiffs satisfy
the jurisdictional amount also applies to class actions based on
federal question jurisdiction."' Even though the majority cites sev-
eral areas of federal question jurisdiction specifically exempted
from any jurisdictional amount by Congress," 2 the effect of Zahn
1453 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
105469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
10394 U.S. 332 (1969).
1042 U.S.L.W. at 4090, citing the Second Circuit's opinion, 469 F.2d at 1035.
'"See 42 U.S.L.W. at 4092. The Court cited the following examples: Compul-
sory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348
(1961), aff'g 275 F.2d 148 (1960); intervention as of right under Rule 24(a), Phelps
v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); cross-claims under Rule 13(g), R.M. Smythe & Co.
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); impleaded defendants under Rule
14, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962);
defendants interpleaded under Rule 22, Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st
Cir. 1955).
11142 U.S.L.W. at 4092.
"'Snyder v. Harris, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
"'42 U.S.L.W. at 4091 n.11.
"'See 28 U.S.C. § 1333-34, 1336-40, 1343-45, 1347-58, 1361-62.
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is most assuredly to render it exceedingly difficult, if indeed not
impossible, for a class action to be maintained in the federal courts
on a theory of public nuisance."'
In many federal and state court class actions, the plaintiffs
have been "environmentalist" groups."' Consequently, it is impor-
tant to consider the circumstances under which an organizational
plaintiff is deemed a proper party to sue on behalf of some or all
of its members." 5 In Association of Data Processing v. Camp, "' the
Supreme Court delineated the two requirements that must be met
before an organizational plaintiff has standing to sue under a fed-
eral statute: "The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic
or otherwise. . . . [The second] question [is] whether the inter-
est sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the stat-
ute ... .
At the state court level, the various courts have adopted simi-
lar approaches. In Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp.,"8 the Florida District Court of Appeals stated that "an or-
ganizational plaintiff has a sufficient right or has suffered a suffi-
cient injury in this context if all or some of its members have been
or will be directly and personally aggrieved in some manner relat-
ing to, and within the scope of, the interests represented and ad-
vanced by the organization.""'
The standing problems of the organizational plaintiff appear
to be the least of the problems encountered by plaintiffs in class
action environmental or nuisance suits. Courts now generally rec-
"'It is most unlikely that a class of plaintiffs satisfying the jurisdictional
amount could be assembled that would be large enough to qualify as a valid class
action under the well-settled "impracticability of joinder" test. See note 88 supra.
In other words, a class would be either too small or composed of plaintiffs that must
be dismissed. For an overview of federal class actions, see generally Note, Federal
Class Action in Environmental Litigation: Problems and Possibilities, 51 N.C.L.
REV. 1385 (1973).
"'See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
"'See generally Note, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 1973 (1973); Note, Administrative
Law: Standing to Represent the Public Interest-The Password is Injury, 25 U. FLA.
L. REV. 233 (1972).
"1397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
117397 U.S. at 152-53.
"'281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. App. 1973).
111d. at 576-77.
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ognize that bona fide non-profit organizations whose members
share a lawful common interest are proper parties to bring environ-
mental suits, assuming that there is a justiciable controversy and
the plaintiff organization alleges a personal injury. 2 '
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR ABOLITION OF THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE
A. The Need for a Forum and a Remedy
Beneath all the rhetoric and technicalities of nuisance and
environmental.law is the fundamental human desire to live a safe,
healthful, and pleasant life. When intervening pollutants or other
nuisances unreasonably interfere with an individual's well-being,
then the law must endeavor to protect that individual from those
interferences. All too often, however, victimized plaintiffs find that
they have neither a forum nor a remedy.12'
An example of this type of case is Hagedorn v. Union Carbide
Corp.'22 In this case, the plaintiff and his wife sued on behalf of
their minor child and approximately 950 persons living in the vi-
cinity of Anmoore, West Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's plant in Anmoore was polluting the air by emitting
dirt, graphite, dust, gases, and fumes. The plaintiffs also named
as defendants the West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commis-
sion, the National Air Pollution Control Administration, and oth-
ers. Despite the plaintiffs' various claims of jurisdiction the district
court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 12
In Hagedorn, the plaintiffs alleged six separate bases of juris-
diction. The first contention was that the acts of the defendant
deprived the plaintiffs of their rights as guaranteed by the fifth
(life, health, and property), ninth (fundamental human right of
'
20See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971).
"'For a discussion of private remedies, see generally SAx, DEFENDING THE ENvi-
RONMENT-A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1972); Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J.
425 (1974); Cramton, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field-Peril or Promise?,
25 AD. L. REV. 147 (1973); Mannino, Citizen Suits to Protect the Environment: An
Introduction to Some 'New Remedies,' 44 PA. B.A.Q. 181 (1973); Oakes,
Environmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions for the Future,
5 CONN. L. REv. 531 (1973); Trumbull, Private Environmental Legal Action, 7
U.S.F.L. REv. 27 (1972).
12363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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survival), and fourteenth (equal protection) amendments to the
United States Constitution. The court rejected this argument and
cited Ely v. Velde,'14 wherein the Fourth Circuit stated: "While a
growing number of commentators argue in support of a constitu-
tional protection for the environment, this newly-advanced consti-
tutional doctrine has not yet been accorded judicial sanction
.... "15 The court in Hagedorn also cited Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp.,'20 a case arising from a set of facts similar to Hagedorn. The
Tanner court wrote that "no legally enforceable right to a healthful
environment, giving rise to an action for damages, is guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of the Fed-
eral Constitution. As the United States Supreme Court recently
observed in rejecting a similarly imaginative constitutional claim,
'the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every so-
cial and economic ill.' "127
The plaintiffs' second allegation of jurisdiction involved the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.12 They asserted that the State Commis-
sion's sanctioning of the defendant's "so-called 'Air Pollution
Abatement program' amounts to a state license to pollute,""'2 and,
therefore, constituted "state action" for the purposes of section
1982 of title forty two of the United States Code. The court rejected
this argument, relying on Johnson v. Capital City Lodge No. 74,
FOP,""5 which stated that state action is only one prerequisite to a
section 1983 action; the plaintiff must first have suffered a depriva-
tion of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Inasmuch as the court rejected plaintiffs' earlier constitu-
tional argument, it ruled that the plaintiffs could not sue under
section 1983.
The third alleged basis of jurisdiction was the Administrative
Procedure Act (A.P.A.).13' The plaintiffs contended that the failure
on the part of the National Air Pollution Control Administration
to designate Anmoore, West Virginia, an air quality control region
had injured the plaintiffs. The court rejected this argument and
12'451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
'jId. at 1139. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F.
Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
111340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
'Id. at 537, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
'p42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974). Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1973).
1'1363 F. Supp. at 1065.
'477 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1973).
1315 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1967).
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stated that the A.P.A. alone does not confer jurisdiction on the
court.' 32 The court further stated that the A.P.A. does not sanction
judicial review where a statute precludes it,' and the Clean Air
Act only provides for judicial review of non-discretionary acts."34
The final three alleged grounds for jurisdiction were summa-
rily rejected by the court. The court ruled that the plaintiffs could
not invoke jurisdiction under United States Code title twenty-
eight, section 1331 because they did not have a "substantial claim
founded directly upon federal law."' 3 The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim of diversity jurisdiction to hear the state court claims
of nuisance and trespass, noting that both the plaintiffs and co-
defendant West Virginia Air Pollution Control Administration
were West Virginia citizens, thus destroying total diversity as re-
quired by Strawbridge v. Curtiss.'5 Finally, the court ruled that
the Declaratory Judgment Act' 7 could not be used to confer juris-
diction where there otherwise was none.
The inability of the plaintiffs in Hagedorn to maintain a suit
in the district court on a federal cause of action would not be
catastrophic if they were able to bring suit in State court. Unfor-
tunately, however, in State court the plaintiffs would have been
faced with the same standing problems that have been discussed
in the preceding pages. First, there is no provision for private suits
under the West Virginia Air Pollution Control Act.'3 Second, suing
under a theory of public nuisance, the defendants would not have
standing unless they could show special injury. '39 In effect, the
plaintiffs had neither a forum nor a remedy.
'See Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 911, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 855 (1970).
235 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1967); Caulfield v. Department of Agriculture, 293 F.2d
217 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 369 U.S. 858 (1962).
13142 U.S.C. §§ 1857h-2, h-5 (1973). See also note 54 supra.
1n363 F. Supp. at 1068, citing Gulley v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
2387 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
13728 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1959).
'See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-20 (1972 Replacement Volume).
3
'The plaintiffs claimed that the pollution aggravated a respiratory ailment of
their daughter. The test, however, is the plaintiff of "ordinaryeensibilities." See
Venuto v. Owen-Coming Fiberglass Corp., supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text. The plaintiffs also contended that the pollution dirtied their property, but it
is questionable whether this would have constituted sufficient injury to their prop-
erty to give them standing. Ultimately, the plaintiffs chose not to bring an action
in State court. Interview with John Boettner, co-counsel for the plaintiffs, Feb. 22,
1974.
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B. The Role of Public Nuisance
Three possible approaches can be used to give individual
plaintiffs freer access to the courts in environmental public nui-
sance cases. The first approach is for the courts to infer a constitu-
tional right to a healthful environment from any number of possi-
ble constitutional sources. 140 As noted in Hagedorn v. Union
Carbide Corp.,' however, courts have not given credence to this
contention, nor are courts in future cases likely to be eager to
interpolate sweeping new constitutional rights from inexplicit con-
stitutional language.4 2
The second possibility for greater standing for private plain-
tiffs is by legislative enactment. In the last ten years, Congress and
state legislatures have enacted a plethora of legislation concerning
the environment and with only a few exceptions these new laws
have not provided any meaningful rights of action for private
plaintiffs. It is unlikely that these laws will be amended in this
regard in the near future.
The final possibility is the law of public nuisance. In its pres-
ent posture, however, nuisance law is archaic and unresponsive to
present day environmental needs. As Professor Wright noted:
"Poor old nuisance has been the common law's meager response
to the crowdedness of society. The doctrine is pathetically inade-
quate to deal with the social realities of this half-century ....
Even though nuisance cannot possibly deal with many types of
problems, such as large-scale pollution, it has the potential of
being an excellent cause of action for private plaintiffs in a variety
of cases. The law of public nuisance is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass an assortment of incursions into the safety, health, and wel-
fare of individual citizens. 44 It is a relatively straightforward con-
cept that can be litigated easily, efficiently, and promptly. Fur-
thermore, nuisance provides a variety of remedies including past
"'See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: E=MCI Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELLL. REv. 674 (1970);
Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458 (1970).
"'363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
"zBut cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (right of association).
1OWright, The Federal Courts and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. Rav, 317,
331 (1967).
USee, e.g., notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
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damages, permanent damages, and injunctions."5
The major problem with public nuisance law in its present
state is the issue of standing-or more specifically the special in-
jury rule. By merely abolishing the special injury rule, courts could
drastically reduce the number of "remedy-less" interferences with
the well-being of individual citizens. At the same time that the law
is becoming significantly more responsive, it would neither be diffi-
cult to administer, nor likely to result in over-congested dockets."'
C. Conclusion
Public nuisance law encompasses a multitude of interferences
with the health and comfort of the public, for which public officials
always have standing to sue. Under the special injury rule, how-
ever, which is the law in all fifty states, only individuals who have
suffered a special injury to their person or land have standing.
Federal and state environmental statutes have not appreciably
expanded the standing restrictions imposed on private citizens.
Similarly, class actions and constitutional claims have been un-
successful in giving greater standing to individual plaintiffs. By
abolishing the special injury rule the courts can revitalize the law
of public nuisance and make it a valuable device for private par-
ties.
,.See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
"'The Florida District Court of Appeals, in Save Sand Key v. United States
Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. App. 1973), directly addressed this concern. The
court stated:
"[T]he dockets . . . have not increased appreciably as a result of the
new cases in which standing would previously have been denied." Scan-
well Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859, 872
(D.C. Cir. 1970). See also, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C.,
354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1462,
16 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966).
Professor Kenneth C. Davis likewise points out that experience of the
federal courts themselves shows that floods of litigation do not result
when the judicial doors are opened to all. A 1953 case, Reade v. Ewing,
205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) held that a 'consumer'-anyone who eats-has
standing to challenge action of the Food and Drug Administration. If
consumers have brought many cases, they must all be unreported. See
Davis, [The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970)]
.. at 471.
281 So. 2d 575 n.18.
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